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Duquesne Law Review
CRIMINAL LAW-HOMICIDE-FELONY MURDER-CAUSATION-DEGREE
OF PROOF-The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held that the
medical causation needed in a homicide case must be established "be-
yond a reasonable doubt," as opposed to "reasonable degree of medical
certainty."
Commonwealth v. Embry, 441 Pa. 183, 272 A.2d 178 (1971).
On the morning of December 20, 1967, around 10:45 A.M., Hattie
Littlestone, seventy-one years of age, was set upon and robbed of her
purse by the three defendants. In the ensuing struggle to prevent the
purse-snatching, she fell to the ground and the defendants fled. Miss
Littlestone was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital.' The chief
forensic pathologist for the Coroner's Office of Allegheny County,
Cyril H. Wecht, M.D., who performed the autopsy, testified for the
prosecution that the sole cause of death was a myocardial infarction,
commonly termed a "heart attack." Despite the existence of a past
history of cardiac-related problems,2 Dr. Wecht further opined, "with
a reasonable degree of medical certainty," that the myocardial infarc-
tion was caused by physical and emotional stress occasioned by the
purse snatching and ensuing struggle. No other evidence was presented
by the Commonwealth to "directly" link the purse snatching with Miss
Littlestone's death. Dr. Wecht expressly admitted that, while he was
positively certain that death occurred due to the infarction, he was
not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the struggle produced
the stress which, in turn, could have caused the myocardial infarction.
Instead, he was only able to reconstruct the chain of "causation" with
a "reasonable degree of medical certainty."
The court charged the jury that they must make their findings from
the facts and circumstances in the case and from the reasonable infer-
ences which may be drawn from them. The opinion of a physician
adds no fact or circumstance. The jury is never bound by the opinion
of the coroner's physician. If his opinion is that the actions of the
defendants caused the death of the victim, his degree of certainty is
never controlling. If he should say he is positive as to the cause of
death, the jury is not bound to find the cause of death to be as the
1. Commonwealth v. Embry, 441 Pa. 183, 272 A.2d 178 (1971).
2. Dr. Wecht testified that the autopsy also revealed the victim had "evidence of long-
standing disease of the coronary arteries and evidence of old scarring in the heart from
previous heart attacks, previous myocardial infarctions."
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physician opines. If the coroner's physician states that in his opinion
the actions of a defendant or defendants caused the death of a victim
and that he gives this opinion with a "reasonable degree of medical
certainty," he has given an opinion which the jury may consider. The
physician's opinion is a guide to the jury which it may follow or not
as it determines.3 The mere fact that the physician may say on cross
examination that he has a reasonable doubt in his mind affects the
weight of the opinion but does not destroy the physician's testimony.
The test of sufficiency of the evidence is the same whether guilt is based
upon direct or circumstantial evidence. The test is "whether accepting
as true all the evidence upon which, if believed, the jury could prop-
erly have based its verdict, it is sufficient in law to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged."14
The appellants were found guilty of murder in the first degree by way
of the felony-murder rule by verdict of the jury with punishment fixed
at life imprisonment.
On appeal the conviction was reversed. Although a variety of con-
tentions were raised, because of the court's disposition of the appeal
they confined their discussion to one point-whether sufficient evi-
dence was introduced to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Hattie
Littlestone's death was caused by a criminal agency.
Although it is hornbook law that a jury is never bound by an expert
witness, when only one witness is presented by the Commonwealth to
establish causation and that witness cannot do so beyond a reasonable
doubt, a necessary element of the proof of that crime is missing. Hence
the corpus delicti was not proven.
In Commonwealth v. Radford,6 the case that was primarily relied
upon to support the decision in the present case, the court clearly
indicated that the "[c]ommonwealth is charged with the responsibility
of proving every essential element of a crime beyond a reasonable
3. Commonwealth v. Heckathorn, 429 Pa. 534, 537, 241 A.2d 97, 99 (1968). "For over
100 years it has been a well-established rule in this Commonwealth that the jury has
the right and power to decide the guilt or innocence of an accused and what crime or
crimes, if any, he has been guilty of." A similar view was held in all of the following
cases: Commonwealth v. Schmidt, 423 Pa. 432, 224 A.2d 625 (1966); Commonwealth v. Meas,
415 Pa. 41, 202 A.2d 74 (1964); Commonwealth v. Frazier, 411 Pa. 195,191 A.2d 369 (1963);
Commonwealth v. Steele, 362 Pa. 427, 66 A.2d 825 (1949).
4. Commonwealth v. Kravitz, 400 Pa. 198, 201, 161 A.2d 861, 862 (1960); Commonwealth
v. Commander, 436 Pa. 532, 538, 260 A.2d 773, 776 (1970).
5. In Pennsylvania, the felony-murder rule punishes as first degree all murders which
shall be committed in the perpetration of, or in attempting to perpetrate, any arson, rape,
robbery, burglary, or kidnapping. Act of June 24, 1939, P.L. 872, § 701, PURDON's PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4701 (1963).
6. 428 Pa. 279, 236 A.2d 802 (1968).
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doubt.' '7 In that case the crux of the problem presented on appeal was
whether the beating administered by the defendants was the "legal
cause" of the thrombosis which set off a chain reaction eventually
resulting in death. After careful study and evaluation of the notes of
testimony, the court was drawn to the conclusion that, at best, the
expert's medical testimony indicated that the defendant's assault on the
deceased probably caused the death. This was insufficient to present a
prima facia case. However, the question of whether the causation could
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt was never asked, since it was
held that such a question would invade the province of the jury.
Commonwealth v. Embry8 has now established that it is a proper ques-
tion and that causation beyond a reasonable doubt is necessary to
establish a prima facia case.
The significance of this decision lies in the language "beyond a
reasonable doubt," a medical standard for causation. This standard
expressly overrules a long line of prior cases9 which relied on the rule
that the corpus delicti is proven if the facts are consistent with death
by criminal means, even though the possibility of accident or suicide
cannot be eliminated. Hence, we see from this last phrase that causa-
tion had to be simply probable-a test used today in civil cases.
The only difficulty encountered in making the last statement, which
expressly overrules a long line of prior Pennsylvania cases,10 lies in the
somewhat unusual factual situation presented in Commonwealth v.
Embry." "Since physical and emotional stress cannot be demonstrated
at an autopsy it can only be assumed with a reasonable degree of logic
and medical certainty based upon experience and training as a phy-
sician,"' 2 which we are told by the supreme court is not enough to
prove the corpus delicti. However, that difficulty can be overcome by
taking into account the testimony given by Bertha McKissock, a regi-
7. Commonwealth v. Wucherer, 351 Pa. 305, 311, 41 A.2d 574, 577 (1945). "Causation
being an essential element to the crime of murder, the failure of the Commonwealth to
prove more than probable causation justified the lower court's grant of defendant's motion
in arrest of judgement." Tiffany v. Commonwealth, 121 Pa. 165, 180, 15 A. 462, 464
(1888); Commonwealth v. Flax. 331 Pa. 14, 154,200 A. 632, 637 (1938).
8. Commonwealth v. Embry, 441 Pa. 183, 272 A.2d 178 (1971).
9. Commonwealth ex rel. Peters v. Maroney, 415 Pa. 553, 204 A.2d 459 (1964); Common-
wealth v. Williams, 304 Pa. 299, 156 A. 86 (1931); Commonwealth v. Cheeks, 423 Pa. 67,
223 A.2d 291 (1966); Commonwealth v. Chester, 410 Pa. 45, 188 A.2d 323 (1963); Common-
wealth v. Turza, 340 Pa. 128, 16 A.2d 401 (1940); Commonwealth v. Scovern, 292 Pa. 26,
33,140 A. 611, 614 (1928); Commonwealth v. Eisenhower, 181 Pa. 470, 37 A. 521 (1897).
10. Id.
11. Commonwealth v. Embry, 441 Pa. 183, 272 A.2d 178 (1971).
12. Id.
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stered nurse, 13 "upon hearing someone calling or moaning I turned and
went back to where Hattie Littlestone was lying on the sidewalk with a
food cart lying across her" She heard Hattie say, "they took my purse."
She noticed that Hattie had a thick tongue; she found Hattie had no pulse
and saw her "die right there." It is submitted that one can reasonably
assume that, if this medical testimony is not enough to sustain the
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, it never will be sustained
in any type of case were a person dies from something other than an
injury which is visible to the naked eye. In addition, if we compare
the testimony in Commonwealth ex rel. Peters v. Maroney1 4 to the
testimony in the present case, it will become more obvious that this
case is not limited to its facts and has the potential to greatly change
the law. In Commonwealth v. Maroney,15 where the defendant was
convicted of murder, Dr. Theodore R. Helmbold, a qualified patholo-
gist, testified that in his opinion there was a causal relationship between
the injury and the pneumonia which resulted in death. Confinement
to bed that results from a fall could easily be complicated by acute
bronchial pneumonia. Of course, the confinement to bed itself is not
the only cause of this illness. An individual who has suffered a trau-
matic experience has sustained a certain amount of shock, which might
also contribute to this condition. Comparing this testimony to Com-
monwealth v. Embry,'6 where Dr. Wecht testified that the physical and
emotional trauma sustained by Hattie Littlestone as a result of the
incidents was in his opinion, on the basis of reasonable medical cer-
tainty, the cause of death, one finds completely contrary result with
almost identical testimony. This certainty supports the supposition
that this case does expressly overrule prior cases stating that direct
causation is properly a jury question in Pennsylvania." What makes
this decision carry more weight is the fact that it was a unanimous
decision.
Although this case has potentially far reaching effects, its decision
should not come as a complete surprise in that the whole felony-murder
doctrine is somewhat in disfavor at the present time, 8 as evidenced by
13. Id.
14. 415 Pa. 553, 204 A.2d 459 (1964).
15. Id.
16. Commonwealth v. Embry, 441 Pa. 183, 272 A.2d 178 (1971).
17. Commonwealth v. Smoker, 204 Pa. Super. 265, 203 A.2d 358 (1964); Commonwealth
v. Harttle, 200 Pa. Super. 318, 188 A.2d 795 (1963); Commonwealth v. Williams, 304 Pa. '299,
156 A. 86 (1931).
18. R. PERKINS, PERKINS ON CRIMINAL LAW 721 (2d ed. 1969).
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the recent decision in Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers,'9 which
expressly overruled Commonwealth v. Almeida.20 While precedent is
to be found for application of the tort-law concept of "proximate
cause" in fixing responsibility for criminal homicide, the want of any
rational basis for its use in determining criminal liability can no longer
be properly disregarded. 21 Although the main issue was proximate as
opposed to direct causation in criminal cases, it shows us how courts
are discarding tort concepts, which had been applied in the criminal
areas, for lack of sufficient basis to justify the results they then felt
necessary. This is exactly what has happened in Commonwealth v.
Embry.22 There, the court's realization that the test, "reasonable degree
of medical certainty," is not consistent with the corpus delicti of crime;
it is simply a different way of compelling a "high degree of proba-
bility," which is not probability "beyond a reasonable doubt" and,
therefore, should logically be discarded as the test of causation needed
in a criminal case.
The above indicates a new medical standard for causation and would
seem to be a highly significant change in the law. However, its effect
may be shackled by raising a problem of semantics. It is submitted
that in Dr. Wecht's testimony his inability to state the relationship
between the robbery and the death "beyond a reasonable doubt" rather
than with "reasonable medical certainty" was in terms of medical
exactitude and not in terms of legal causation. It is hornbook law that
the empirical exactitude of science cannot be taken as the yardstick
of legal decision making. Medical causation and legal causation are
qualitatively different in their application. The scientist must strive
to be more than "reasonable" in his judgment if his work is to have
scientific validity; the jurist must be content to make rational judg-
ments which more often than not serve the cause of justice. The poten-
tial impact of this case on the law in Pennsylvania is uncertain until
the courts determine whether any steps will be taken to abridge,
abolish, or alter the semantic problems which we are confronted with
in comparing legal and medical causation. It can only be hoped that
the wisdom of Commonwealth v. Embry2. will be followed, instead of
the inequities involved both in the use of the term "highly probable"
19. 438 Pa. 218, 261 A.2d 550 (1970); see 9 DUQ. L. REv. 122 (1970).
20. 362 Pa. 596, 68 A.2d 595 (1949).
21. 71 DicK. L. REv. 523 (1966).
22. Commonwealth v. Embry, 441 Pa. 183, 272 A.2d 178 (1971).
23. Id.
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in criminal cases and the submission of this nebulous concept to the
jury.24
Bart Max Beier
INSURANCE CONTRACT-BURGLARY-The Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania has upheld recovery on a Homeowner's Policy to indemnify the
perpetrator of a crime for damages not intentionally caused in the
course of a burglary.
Eisenman v. Hornberger, 438 Pa. 46, 264 A.2d 673 (1970).
On the night of February 4, 1960, Alton Raymond Hornberger, seven-
teen, and other youths, broke into the Eisenman house and stole a
quantity of liquor. To avoid possible detection, the boys lit matches
instead of turning on the lights. As the matches burned down, they
were dropped or thrown on the floor. Though there was no sign of fire
when the boys left, apparently one of the matches became lodged in a
stuffed chair. A fire resulted which enveloped the house, destroying
all the personal property. Eisenman initiated an action for damages
against Hornberger and was awarded a verdict. A writ of execution
against Hornberger was returned nulla bona, defendant without suffi-
cient funds.
When Hornberger committed the burglary, he was included under
his father's Homeowner's Policy issued by the Royal Insurance Co.,
Ltd. Under the terms of the policy, Royal agreed "to pay on behalf
of the insured all sums which insured shall become legally obligated to
pay as damages because of ... property damages . . . ."I Property dam-
age is defined in the policy as "injury to or destruction of property,"
and is in no way limited to property of the insured.2 An exclusionary
clause released the insurer from liability for any property damage
caused "intentionally by or at the direction of the insured."3
24. Subsequent to Embry the United States Supreme Court and the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court have pointedly referred to the possibility that due process might require
that a criminal presumption be factually accurate beyond a reasonable doubt. Leary v.
United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1970); Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970); Common-
wealth v. Owens, - Pa. -, 271 A.2d 230 (1970).
1. Eisenman v. Hornberger, 438 Pa. 46, 48, 264 A.2d 673, 674 (1970).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 49, 264 A.2d at 674.
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